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Testimony of Edward T. Swaine
Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School
United States Senate Judiciary Committee
June 20, 2012
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Grassley, thank you for inviting me to appear
before the Committee today to testify on the subject of Holocaust-Era Claims in the 21st
Century.
I have been asked to focus on the relationship between the proposed Holocaust
Rail Justice Act (S. 634) and international law. I am happy to do so. I teach and write at
in the fields of international law, human rights law, and foreign relations law, each of
which involves the human rights and immunity issues at the bill’s core. I also gained
experience with the subject during government service, both at the Justice Department
and as a former Counselor on International Law at the State Department. Although my
remarks are in my personal capacity only, I am also engaged in international law as a
member of the Executive Council of the American Society of International Law, a
leading organization in the study of international law and international relations.
It is important to stress the limits to my remarks. I will not attempt to describe in
detail the tragic events addressed in S. 634’s findings, which no one should ever forget,
nor the range of efforts to secure reparations. I will avoid policy questions of the kind
addressed to Congress and the executive branch, such as the relative merits of alternative
remedies. And I will not be addressing many claims and defenses that would presumably
arise in any ensuing litigation, which would be addressed to our courts. Instead, I will
focus on how international law considerations might inform Congress’ judgment.
Unfortunately, although it is a carefully tailored solution to a compelling problem, S. 634
confronts substantial challenges under existing law, because of the functional and
geographic breadth of liability it proposes for state-owned entities.
Background
European governments and businesses – spurred by U.S. leadership, particularly
that provided by Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat – have made great strides in establishing
administrative mechanisms that provide a form of “imperfect justice” for Holocaust
victims. However, not every kind of claim has been addressed to date, and some cases
have been litigated in U.S. courts – including, as relevant here, claims against the French
national railroad, SNCF, for the role it played in forced deportations to Nazi
concentration camps.1 A central question in these cases has been whether SNCF enjoys
1

See Freund v. SNCF, 391 Fed. Appx. 939 (2nd Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal on immunity grounds of
class action brought by Holocaust survivors and their heirs and beneficiaries against France, SNCF, and the
French national depository, based on seizure and retention of personal property during forced deportations
to Nazi concentration camps); Abrams v. SNCF, 389 F.3d 61 (2nd Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal on
immunity grounds of class action brought by Holocaust survivors and their heirs and beneficiaries against
SNCF based on war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during forced deportation to Nazi
concentration camps); see also Victims of the Hungarian Holocaust v. Hungarian State Railways, 798 F.
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sovereign immunity from suit, which has been resolved under the general principles
established in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). For example, during the
Abrams v. SNCF litigation, it was held that SNCF was an “agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state” under the FSIA, and thus considered part of a “foreign state” presumptively
entitled to immunity.2 Further, no exception to immunity applied. As to the FSIA’s
exception for commercial activities, the district court explained, “there is clearly no
commercial activity by a foreign state carried on in the United States, and there is no act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity by a foreign
state,” and finally no sufficient “act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of a foreign state that causes a direct effect in the
United States.” As to the non-commercial tort exception, “no part of the tort . . . occurred
in the United States,” and neither the waiver exception nor the exception for state
sponsors of terrorism was deemed applicable.3
S. 634 would dictate a different result in this and potentially additional cases.
Essentially, the bill would remove immunity for railroads that owned and operated trains
involved in the transportation and deportation of persons in France to concentration
camps between 1940 and 1944, so long as the railroad was at that time a separate legal
entity, regardless of whether it was then or is now owned by a foreign state. There
would, accordingly, be no inquiry by U.S. courts into the scope of sovereign immunity or
its exceptions.
In Abrams and other cases, the parties debated whether SNCF and other railroads
would have enjoyed immunity under international law, either based on the law relating to
sovereign immunity as it stood at that time or based on contemporary law. Because the
courts found that immunity is dictated by the terms of the FSIA, they did not need to
resolve international law questions. If Congress were to amend the FSIA, this would
pose squarely the question whether doing so is consistent with international law.
The Salience of International Law
When it enacted the FSIA in 1976, thereby codifying for the United States a
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, Congress was attentive to customary
international law – rules derived from the general practice of states accepted as law.
The statute occasionally references international law in addressing the types of
claims for which foreign states lack immunity. Most exceptions to foreign state
immunity are mundane; the premise of the restrictive theory is that states lack immunity
when they engage in conduct like that of private parties, such as when they enter
contracts. Nevertheless, the FSIA maintains a few exceptions for distinctively sovereign
Supp. 2d 934 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (denying motion to dismiss under the FSIA of class action against Hungarian
state railroad for seizure of Jewish possessions and expropriation of Jewish funds during the Holocaust).
2
Abrams v. SNCF, 389 F.3d 61 (2nd Cir. 2004); see also Freund v. Republic of France, 592 F. Supp. 2d
540, 554-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting, additionally, plaintiffs’ concession that SNCF was an “agency or
instrumentality” for purposes of the FSIA), aff’d, 391 Fed. Appx. 939 (2nd Cir. 2010).
3
Abrams v. SNCF, 175 F. Supp. 2d 423, 429-33 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
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conduct that violates international law – for example, the longstanding exception for
certain cases in which “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in
issue” (28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(3)). There are no exceptions, however, for conduct by the
sovereign that violates human rights norms generally or other international obligations.
The fact that more attention is paid in the FSIA to establishing accountability
when governments engage in commercial or other private conduct, but relatively little
when governments violate their international obligations, is purposeful – and
communicates no lack of respect for international law norms. When a sovereign state
violates international law, it is understood that it may discharge its international legal
responsibility, including a responsibility to make reparations, without necessarily
subjecting itself involuntarily to litigation in foreign domestic courts. And a sovereign
state does not generally assume an obligation under international law to open its national
courts to allow civil suits against other states based on their violations of international
law.
To the contrary, international law provides that governments must respect the
immunity of other sovereigns – and Congress was mindful of this when it enacted the
FSIA. The House Judiciary Committee recognized sovereign immunity as “a doctrine of
international law under which domestic courts relinquish jurisdiction over a foreign
state,” and sought to revert to a practice based on the “law and practice of nations,”
noting that “[i]n virtually every country, the United States has found that sovereign
immunity is a question of international law to be determined by the courts.”4 Thus, as the
Supreme Court has recognized, Congress sought both “adoption of the restrictive view of
sovereign immunity and codification of international law at the time of the FSIA's
enactment.”5 It is unsurprising, then, that the FSIA’s findings and declaration of purpose
explain that subjecting foreign states to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts for their
commercial activities was consistent with international law (28 U.S.C. § 1602).
The international law of sovereign immunity has not changed markedly since the
FSIA was enacted. While the General Assembly adopted the UN Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property in 2004, it largely agrees with the
restrictive approach adopted by the United States, and the Convention is not yet in force
(nor has the United States ratified it).
The same reasons for heeding international law, too, remain. Generally, of
course, the United States has an abiding interest in signaling its respect for international
law whenever it can, because that will reinforce our own reputation for compliance and
sustain our ability to insist that other states adhere to their obligations. More particularly,
the U.S. government has a clear interest in ensuring respect by foreign states and their
courts for our sovereign immunity. No other state is as active beyond its borders –
militarily, commercially, diplomatically – as we are, and U.S. policies and prosperity
make it an inviting target for lawsuits, including sometimes on the basis of alleged
violations of international law. If sovereign immunity were disregarded, the United
4
5

H.R. Rep. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976), 1976 USSCAN 6604, 6606, 6608.
Permanent Mission of India to United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 199 (2007).
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States and its agencies and instrumentalities could be sued based on allegations involving
civilians injured in drone strikes, torture, or extraordinary renditions – or, using more
novel international law theories, based on allegations of cyber-attacks or damage to the
global climate. Exposure would be particularly broad if proceedings could be brought
concerning contentious historical events, like past U.S. policy in Central and South
America or Southeast Asia, and if proceedings could be initiated in any foreign court,
regardless of its connection to the events.
To be clear, ensuring U.S. accountability for its wrongdoing is desirable,
including through appropriate judicial proceedings. Even so, steps that might subject the
United States to greater risk of litigation before foreign (and sometimes hostile) courts
requires careful evaluation, and there is no more direct way to compromise our ability to
insist that foreign states honor U.S. sovereign immunity than for us to disregard the
immunity of other governments. The structure of S. 634 may inadvertently accentuate
that possibility. The bill is meticulously drafted to address the facts at hand – that is,
claims arising from specific conduct, occurring during a circumscribed period, and
against a designated class of defendants – in marked contrast to the FSIA, which
generally articulates principles that can be universally applied. Piecemeal legislation may
make it harder to establish a deliberate, consistent, and nondiscriminatory approach that
can be defended in light of international objections. And U.S. interests abroad may be
better protected if our government is subject to generalized principles respecting both
human rights and sovereign immunity, not having encouraged the propagation of eventfocused approaches – which may single out particularly controversial U.S. activities
without the impediment of standards applicable other states or to the foreign state itself.
The Recent Decision on Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy)
The international law of sovereign immunity is addressed by an important recent
judgment by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the most prominent tribunal in the
international legal system. As explained below, the decision echoes principles already
established under the FSIA as a matter of domestic law, but makes clear that they also
bind the United States internationally.
The case, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy),6 involved
admitted wrongdoing by German armed forces in German-occupied Italy during World
War II – including arrests and deportation of Italian nationals to perform forced labor in
Germany, forced labor by members of the Italian armed forces who had been denied
prisoner of war status, and massacres of civilians. Although Germany reached agreement
with Italy on the compensation of Italian nationals for certain wrongs, and subsequently
adopted national law entitling others to compensation, these did not make whole victims
of forced labor and successors in interest to civilians killed in massacres. Beginning in
the late 1990s, these victims commenced multiple proceedings against Germany in Italian
courts, and the Italian Court of Cassation – the court of last resort – held that Germany
lacked immunity for the acts in question. Germany subsequently applied to the ICJ, and
6

Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment (Feb. 3, 2012),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf.
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in a judgment issued this February, it held in Germany’s favor, finding – by a vote of
twelve to three – that Italy had violated customary international law by failing to respect
Germany’s immunity from civil claims.
Germany v. Italy, like the claims being addressed by S. 634, arose from terrible
wrongs committed during the Holocaust. Nonetheless, there are limits to that judgment’s
authority for this matter. To begin with, the judgment binds Italy and Germany in respect
of that particular dispute, but does not in itself formally bind the United States or other
states in connection with different disputes. Rather, it construes customary international
law, which does bind the United States, and sets the benchmark for how other states will
evaluate the legality of our conduct, whether through formal litigation or otherwise.
More important, the claims differ in a potentially critical way. The dispute before
the ICJ involved wrongs committed by Germany armed forces, and more generally,
sovereign acts (jure imperii) rather than commercial or other private acts (jure gestionis)
– while the railroad claims addressed by the bill involve acts depicted in the findings as
more commercial in character. The Court properly stressed that it was not addressing
state acts of a non-sovereign nature (para. 60), and further stated that “[t]he issue before
the Court is confined to acts committed on the territory of the forum State by the armed
forces of a foreign State, and other organs of State working in co-operation with those
armed forces, in the course of conducting an armed conflict” (para. 65).
Despite these important limitations, the judgment remains instructive, and will
certainly inform the judgment of foreign states appraising any U.S. legislation. The ICJ
stated four propositions of potential relevance to S. 634.
First, the Court recalled that “in claiming immunity for themselves or according it
to others, States generally proceed on the basis that there is a right to immunity under
international law, together with a corresponding obligation on the part of other States to
respect and give effect to that immunity” (para. 56). The Court’s understanding that
immunity is a binding obligation under customary international law – which was
common ground between Italy and Germany – is consistent with views expressed by
Congress in adopting the FSIA.
Second, the Court addressed the relevant time frame for reckoning the
international law to be applied. The Court acknowledged the general principle that “the
compatibility of an act with international law can be determined only by reference to the
law in force at the time when the act occurred” (para. 58). It distinguished, however,
between applying this principle to Germany’s conduct – which, having occurred in 19431945, would be governed by the international law applicable during that period – and
applying it to Italy’s acts. As the Court explained, Italy’s alleged violations of
international law stemmed from the recent judicial proceedings against Germany, to
which contemporary international law is applicable; this is consistent with the
“procedural” nature of sovereign immunity, which regulates the exercise of jurisdiction,
and which is distinct from the substantive law regulating whether the underlying conduct
motivating the judicial proceedings is lawful (para. 58).

5
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This approach, too, is consistent with the FSIA as it has been construed by our
courts. In Republic of Austria v. Altmann,7 the Supreme Court determined that the FSIA
applied to conduct occurring prior to its enactment, even before the U.S. moved to adopt
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, in part because this was consistent with
Congress’ objective of establishing a comprehensive framework for resolving immunity
issues. The effect, in the context of that case, was reduce the scope of sovereign
immunity, and to permit plaintiffs seeking the recovery of Nazi-confiscated art the
opportunity to invoke the expropriations exception, but the Court’s reasoning did not turn
on that. In another case, Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,8 the Court held that whether an
entity is part of a foreign state under the FSIA depends on the facts at the time suit is
brought rather than when the conduct occurred. As both the ICJ and the Supreme Court
have emphasized, the question is not whether a foreign state has legitimate expectations
that its conduct, when rendered, will be immune, but rather the circumstances under
which that state will be subject to judicial proceedings.
Third, the ICJ rejected the proposition that the illegality of the underlying conduct
– as opposed to its characterization as sovereign or non-sovereign, or similar inquiries
related to recognized exceptions – affected the immunity inquiry. Thus, the evident
illegality of conduct by German armed forces had no bearing on their sovereign character
(para. 60). The Court further stated that under existing customary international law, even
serious violations of human rights or the laws of war would not deprive a state of
immunity for the relevant acts (para. 91), and similarly concluded that a violation of jus
cogens, or nonderogable, rules would not affect the immunity inquiry (para. 97).
This is not self-evident as a matter of first principles. There is surely a case to be
made for a norm according to which the egregious wrongs committed during the
Holocaust – not just by the railroads – are unprotected by immunity. Other behavior
causing massive human suffering (inhumane bombing campaigns, apartheid and racial
segregation, crimes against humanity, genocide, and torture) might likewise be
interrogated in lawsuits against sovereigns, presumably in another state’s courts, rather
than through international diplomacy, international criminal courts, and other alternative
means.
Nevertheless, the ICJ rejected such an approach as inconsistent with the sovereign
rights secured by customary international law as it now stands. The Court cited its own
precedent and decisions by bodies like the European Court of Human Rights. The Court
also recalled the distinction between the substantive illegality of a foreign state’s acts –
and its duty to make reparations – and the issue of whether immunity permits national
courts to maintain jurisdiction, which in effect implicates only one possible means of
providing reparations (para. 94). Finally, it noted the difficulty of reconciling any
judicial inquiry into the gravity of the underlying violations with the jurisdictional
character of immunity, warning that immunity would be effectively negated if skillful
construction of a claim would subject foreign states to lengthy trials (para. 82).
7
8

541 U.S. 677 (2004).
538 U.S. 468 (2003).
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The Court’s reasoning was strikingly similar to that of U.S. courts, which have
also resisted arguments to the effect that jus cogens claims fall within a nonstatutory
exception to the FSIA, including in cases involving the use of slave labor in Nazi
concentration camps.9 The Supreme Court has not reached this precise question, but has
more broadly suggested that “immunity is granted in those cases involving alleged
violations of international law that do not come within one of the FSIA’s exceptions.”10
Fourth, and finally, the ICJ rejected Italy’s “last resort” argument – the suggestion
that the failure to secure other means by which Germany would compensate victims
warranted denying Germany immunity to which it was otherwise entitled. The Court
criticized Germany’s failure to provide a remedy, particularly its decision to exclude
from its compensation program Italian military detainees (para. 99). Nonetheless, the
Court explained that customary international revealed no principle according to which
immunity depended on the availability of adequate alternatives; it further noted practical
difficulties with making immunity contingent on some indefinite prospect of alternative
redress or, alternatively, inquiring into the purposes to which a foreign state had put
reparations or other remedies it had received (paras. 101-102).
Application to S. 634
How does the proposed legislation comport with these and related principles of
international law? In effect, S. 634 tries to produce a different result on the Abrams facts
by two means: first, by focusing on how railroads were organized during 1940-1944
rather than now; second, by removing immunity without regard to where the conduct
giving rise to the claims occurred.
Historical status of railroads. S. 634 changes the focus from the present-day
status of the defendant railroads – when some, like SNCF, are wholly state-owned and
entitled under U.S. law to be treated as part of a foreign state – to their legal and factual
status when the underlying events occurred, when they may have lacked immunity.
Thus, S. 634 would withdraw immunity from any railroad that owned and operated trains
between approximately 1940 and 1944 and “was, at the time of the transportations or
deportations, a separate legal entity, whether or not any or all of the equity interest in the
railroad was or is owned by a foreign state.” The premise is likely the opinion that during
that period, prior to U.S. adoption of the restrictive theory, a “separate legal entity” like
SNCF was not entitled to immunity.11 Congress presumably has the authority to make
9

See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir.1994); Sampson v. Federal
Republic of Germany 250 F.3d 1145, 1151-56 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 242-45 (2nd Cir.1996); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965
F.2d 699, 706, 718-19 (9th Cir.1992).
10
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
11
Abrams, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 447 (noting reliance by plaintiffs on William C. Hoffman, The Separate
Entity Rule in International Perspective: Should State Ownership of Corporate Shares Confer Sovereign
Status for Immunity Purposes?, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 535 (1991)). The district court noted, however, that it was
entirely possible that immunity would have been conferred even under that approach. See Abrams, 175 F.
Supp. 2d at 447-48.
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such a change as a matter of domestic law, since the Supreme Court’s contrary holdings
in Republic of Austria v. Altmann and Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson simply construed the
FSIA as Congress had then written it.12
International law permits other approaches to defining what constitutes a “foreign
state,” entitled to a foreign state’s immunity, beyond the one Congress has hitherto used
under the FSIA. Title 28, section 1603(a) effectively includes within the definition of a
foreign state all agencies or instrumentalities in which a foreign state has a majority
holding. What matters, ultimately, is the scope of immunity conferred, and the FSIA
accords these agencies and instrumentalities somewhat reduced protection against
service, attachment, and punitive damages. Generally, though, it regulates them
according to the same immunity and exception provisions applicable to other forms of a
foreign state.
Other approaches to defining the notion of a foreign state have been adopted and
seem to be legally available under international law, so long as adequate safeguards are in
place. For example, the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity excludes
immunity for “any legal entity of a Contracting State which is distinct therefrom and is
capable of suing or being sued, even if that entity has been entrusted with public
functions” – an approach, notably, that was intended to limit immunity for entities like
“railway administrations”13 – unless the proceedings concern “acts performed by the
entity in the exercise of sovereign authority (acta jure imperii)” (art. 27). The UN
Convention includes within the definition of a sovereign state “agencies or
instrumentalities . . . or other entities,” if “they are entitled to perform and are actually
performing acts in the exercise of sovereign authority of the State” (art. 2(1)(b)(iii)).
Conversely, it removes the immunity of state enterprises and similar entities that have
“independent legal personality,” can sue and be sued, and can engage in property
transactions, so long as the proceeding relates to their commercial transactions, which (as
under the FSIA) are indirectly contrasted with sovereign functions (arts. 10(3), 2(2)).14
Each convention was relied upon by the ICJ as part of reckoning customary international
law (e.g., Germany v. Italy, para. 66). Regardless of which approach is preferable, it
appears that there is sufficient room for both the FSIA’s present approach and one that –
like S. 634 – pays heed at the threshold to whether an entity has a separate legal identity.
The reason this is permissible is important, because it affects how much latitude
Congress ultimately has. The premise should not be that the United States is capable of
dictating application of the law of sovereign immunity as it existed in 1940-1944, such
that a railroad’s status “at the time of the transportations or deportations” is used to tap
12

If S. 634 is intended to enable the re-opening of a final judgment, however, there may be constitutional
objections. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
13
Explanatory Report, European Convention on State Immunity (ETS No. 074), para. 109, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/HTML/074.htm.
14
See also Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, with Commentaries, in
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-third Session, [1991] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n, pt. 2, at 13, 17 para. 15 (noting theoretical inclusion of state enterprises among “other entities”),
20 para. 25 (distinguishing “commercial transactions” from those “non-commercial or governmental in
nature”), UN GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/46/10 (1991).
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into a prior era’s law. While law in effect from 1940-1944 bears on whether railroads
violated international law, it is the contemporary law of sovereign immunity, applied to
the facts of the railroad’s complained-of conduct during that period, that determines
whether it is presently entitled to sovereign immunity or is governed by one of its
exceptions. As the ICJ indicated in Germany v. Italy: “it is the international law in force
at the time of [judicial proceedings against a foreign state]” which must be applied,
because it is the proceedings that give rise to potential offense against immunity (para.
58). This means that the invocation of immunity by SNCF and other railroads can be
ignored only if doing so is consistent with contemporary international law, regardless of
the result that would have obtained were this suit to have been adjudicated in the 1940s.
To simplify somewhat, it seems plausible that if contemporary international law
permits distinct treatment of certain legally separate entities as they are presently
composed, per the European and UN Conventions, it might permit similar treatment of
state entities on the basis that they were once so composed – perhaps even if they no
longer possess that separate identity, if they did so during the underlying conduct.
Critically, however, nothing in this distinct treatment under contemporary law would
warrant disregarding all immunity for such entities. As previously noted, both the
European Convention and UN Convention inquire whether the separate entity was
nonetheless engaged in the exercise of sovereign authority, in which case it is entitled to
sovereign immunity just as if it were any other part of the state. Similarly, while English
law excludes from the definition of a foreign state “any entity [a “separate entity”] which
is distinct from the executive organs of the government of the State and capable of suing
or being sued,” it separately provides that such a separate entity is entitled to immunity if
“the proceedings relate to anything done by it in the exercise of sovereign authority” and
the circumstances are such that a state would be immune.15 In contrast, S. 634 seems to
withdraw all immunity on the predicate that a state agency or instrumentality was, at a
prior interval, a separate legal entity, mooting any inquiry into whether a claim is based
on sovereign or non-sovereign (for example, commercial) conduct.
Whether or not this approach would be acceptable if applied to the U.S.
government is an important question of policy. Beyond that, rendering S. 634 more
compatible with contemporary international law seems to require two additional steps.
Given the precise geographic focus of S. 634 – and the likelihood that the states
concerned regard the European Convention (to which Germany, but not France, is a
party) and the UN Convention (which France, but not Germany, has approved, but which
is not yet in force) as compatible with customary international law – it would be
appealing to add provisos that accorded with the approach of those treaties.
First, it would be preferable to determine whether an otherwise-qualified railroad
was during 1940-1944 a separate entity of the kind distinguished by international
conventions (and not fully regarded as a foreign state), and whether present international
law genuinely permits ascertaining status at the time the entity engaged in relevant
conduct. (Of course, if a railroad was entirely private at the relevant time, no immunity
would be warranted; if, on the other hand, it was state owned and not legally separate, no
15

State Immunity Act (1978), § 14(1), (2).
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distinct approach to its immunity would be warranted under S. 634 or otherwise.)
Whether S. 634 complies turns in part on what the bill means by the term “separate legal
entity.” Both the European Convention and UN Convention have what appear to be more
demanding tests that must be satisfied before (partly) separating a state-owned entity
from immunity. For example, for the European Convention, which requires both a
distinct existence and capability of suing or being sued, the Explanatory Report stated
that “the criterion of legal personality alone is not adequate, for even a State authority
may have legal personality without constituting an entity distinct from the State,” such
that a dual test was thought necessary to “identify[] those legal entities in Contracting
States which should not be treated as the State.”16
Second, and more critically, it still remains essential to establish that the claims
are based on non-sovereign conduct of some kind, though the burden of establishing
sovereignty might be placed on the railroad.17 For example, one might provide that
immunity could be afforded to any railroad that was a separate legal entity during the
relevant period in 1940-1944, but which would be deemed an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state based on its present status, provided that it could demonstrate that it was
exercising sovereign authority at the relevant time. This would likely reduce the breadth
of international law objections by affording state entities the opportunity to present
immunity defenses for U.S. courts to evaluate – according to standards that the relevant
countries should accept.
To be clear, the result might be to sustain the immunity of railroads, depending on
the facts and pleading. U.S. case law illustrates the contentious and difficult questions
that arise in distinguishing between commercial and sovereign activities; in one case, for
example, the Supreme Court held that intentional torts allegedly committed by Saudi
Arabia against an American employee in a Saudi hospital – including torture – were,
notwithstanding their relation to commercial employment activities, better described as
being “based upon a sovereign activity immune from the subject-matter jurisdiction of
United States courts under the Act.”18 While that decision has been sharply criticized,
international law does not take an altogether different approach in distinguishing between
sovereign and non-sovereign activities, and it plainly reserves to governments the
capacity to breach international law while still claiming that they are exercising
sovereignty. Per Germany v. Italy and the decisions it cites, even jus cogens offenses do
not diminish an activity’s characterization as an act of sovereignty (jure imperii). Thus,
even if proof of jus cogens offenses is mustered in a particular action (though that is not
required by S. 634), it remains possible that courts would order dismissal or, if they did
not, that foreign states would object on the ground that their immunity was not respected.

16

Explanatory Report, European Convention on State Immunity (ETS No. 074), para. 108, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/HTML/074.htm
17
This is consistent with the authority cited to the district court in Abrams. Hoffman, supra, at 564 (stating,
in reference to current national laws, that “[i]n all these jurisdictions, the law clearly provides that the
separate entity’s presumption of nonimmunity may be rebutted by evidence showing that the entity has
acted in a sovereign capacity”).
18
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 363 (1993).
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Geographic scope of exceptions. In addition to pretermitting inquiry into whether
a railroad is engaged in sovereign or non-sovereign (or commercial) activities, S. 634
simultaneously changes the geographic scope of exceptions to sovereign immunity. In
the Abrams proceedings, the fatal difficulty was not whether, in principle, SNCF had
engaged in commercial activities or committed a non-commercial tort, but rather where
any such activity had occurred. Assuming SNCF is deemed now or during 1940-1944 to
be part of a foreign state, or at a minimum to constitute a separate or distinct legal entity
entitled to some measure of immunity, S. 634 would curtail nexus restrictions that limit
the liability of sovereign entities.
The scope of U.S. capacity to adopt civil liability on the basis of universal
jurisdiction – jurisdiction based on the nature of the offense, rather than on territorial
nexus or the nationality of the plaintiff or defendant – is hotly disputed among
governments. It is also the subject of expert briefing in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., which is pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. Without reproducing the extensive
discussions of this question, universal jurisdiction over foreign states is a further bridge to
cross. Territoriality is integrally related to immunity. At its core, international law seeks
to reconcile the sovereign equality of states, which supports state immunity, with the
sovereignty that each state possesses over its own territory, including the right to exercise
jurisdiction that flows from that sovereignty – with which state immunity interferes
(Germany v. Italy, para. 57).
It is unsurprising, then, that territorial elements are a near constant in exceptions
to immunity. For example, the UN Convention makes states accountable for commercial
transactions that “fall within the jurisdiction of a court of another State” (art. 10) and for
torts involving personal injuries or damage to property if, among other things, “the act or
omission occurred in whole or in part in the territory of that other State and if the author
of the act or omission was present in that territory at the time of the act or omission” (art.
12) – the latter being known, revealingly, as the “territorial tort” exception. The
European Convention is suffused with required links to “the territory of the State of the
forum.”
This approach is generally followed in the United States. As previously
mentioned, the commercial activities exception under the FSIA requires a nexus to the
United States (28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)), and the exception for other matters involving
personal injury or death requires (inter alia) requires that the injury or death “occur[] in
the United States” (28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)). One notable departure, however, is the
FSIA exception for state sponsors of terrorism (28 U.S.C. § 1605A). However, that
exception is itself controversial as a matter of international law, and the ICJ noted in
Germany v. Italy that the exception “ha[d] no counterpart in the legislation of other states
(para. 88).19 In articulating the terrorism exception, in any event, Congress adopted
several important safeguards: for example, foreign states must be designated by the
United States as state sponsors of terrorism, and as a substitute for territoriality, claimants

19

A comparable statute was subsequently enacted in Canada. Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, S.C.
2012, c. 1, s.2 (assented to March 13, 2012).
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must be U.S. nationals, members of U.S. armed forces, or government employees or
contract personnel.
S. 634 would not, as introduced, include any similar restriction. To my
knowledge, the bill would be among the first national statutes to establish universal civil
jurisdiction – irrespective, that is of any obvious claim to territorial jurisdiction, or
nationality or passive personality jurisdiction – while simultaneously denying foreign
states the benefit of sovereign immunity.20 The most material limitation, which bears
emphasis, is the requirement that the railroads concerned have separate legal identities at
the time of their conduct, together with a legislative finding that they were engaged in
commercial activities. At least in the absence of reconciling that inquiry with known
international law standards, the bill would be quite exceptional.
I do not mean to overstate this objection. It is difficult to define precise territorial
limits to exercising jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns, or even whether these limits
derive from sovereign immunity or other jurisdictional principles. While territorial
thresholds are kept frequently set higher for foreign state defendants, probably because of
states’ frequent extraterritorial contacts and the political sensitivity of suits against them,
there is no internationally agreed standard. At the end of the day, however, it is doubtful
these points of uncertainty redeem a statute with no nexus requirements whatsoever.
Were S. 634 adopted, the United States might try to defend it as a progressive
measure that pushes the boundaries of universal civil jurisdiction, which many have
advocated for certain international offenses. While the United States has often defended
extraterritorial legislation against foreign complaints, this would be an uphill battle, given
the holding in Germany v. Italy that that a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity
under international law notwithstanding allegations of grave offenses that may give rise
to universal jurisdiction. Some of the leading advocacy for universal jurisdiction,
moreover, has conceded that such jurisdiction if recognized would still be tempered by
appropriate accommodation of immunity.21 Defending this broader proposition –
assuming, that is, that S. 634 extends to entities that colorably enjoy all or some of the
status of foreign states – may risk the argument for universal jurisdiction even over
parties that lack immunity. If accepted, moreover, it would expose the United States
itself to proceedings in any foreign court based on alleged present or past offenses. This
feature requires careful reconsideration in light of international law concerns.
Additional Concerns Relating to International Agreements
As a separate matter, I understand that S. 634, as originally submitted, may be
augmented by text that would retain the immunity of “any railroad that is an agency or
20

Neither the Alien Tort Statute nor the Torture Victim Protection Act, which provide for civil liability,
purport to override state immunity, and various criminal statutes reaching extraterritorial offenses like
piracy or torture are not understood to concern states either.
21
See, e.g., Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 86-87 para. 79 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal).
Indeed, the distinction of cases involving immunity is a recurring features of the briefs recently filed to
defend the Alien Tort Statute as an exercise of universal jurisdiction.
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instrumentality of a foreign state . . . that has contributed, as of January 1, 2010, to any
fund established under an agreement of the United States of America to resolve
Holocaust-related claims in United States courts.” This is a well-conceived and welcome
attempt to respect existing agreements. Although Congress generally enjoys the right
under U.S. law to limit the domestic legal effect of international agreements entered into
by the United States, this has no effect on the international legal responsibility of the
United States. For this reason, exempting international agreements is highly desirable.
Nonetheless, the exemption may narrower than is intended, in that the relevant
U.S. agreements may not invariably be characterized as being to “resolve Holocaustrelated claims in United States courts.” For example, under the German Foundation
Agreement, which involved substantial contributions by both the German government
and by German companies, claims in U.S. courts were not conclusively resolved. Rather,
the United States agreed to represent in U.S. judicial proceedings that our foreign policy
interests favored using the Foundation as an exclusive forum for resolving World War IIera claims against German companies, and that these interests favored “dismissal on any
valid legal ground,” but stopped short of guaranteeing that these interests would “in
themselves provide an independent legal basis for dismissal.”22 It is unclear whether
contributions by a German railroad to the fund established by this agreement would allow
it to retain immunity under the bill.
Finally, if and to the extent there is interest in fostering alternatives to U.S.
litigation, provision might be made for the legislation’s suspension upon some form of
executive branch certification – for example, that negotiation concerning reparations for
the implicated claims was ongoing. I am not in a position to evaluate whether that kind
of provision is warranted in light of diplomatic realities, or whether the executive branch
would welcome it. However, it would not resolve other international law issues posed.
*

*

*

Because Congress has paid heed to international law in enacting and amending
the FSIA, the United States has generally managed to avoid international controversy,
thereby contributing to the legal integrity of our domestic judicial processes. This proves
important when, as is inevitable, politically sensitive matters against foreign sovereigns
are litigated in our courts – and helps to ensure that foreign states obey international law
when contemplating litigation against the U.S. government in their courts.
Claims like those addressed by S. 634 deserve to be addressed in some forum.
The bill presents difficult questions with which the political branches should be engaged,
requiring attention both toward respecting human rights, on one hand, and toward
respecting the legal rights of foreign sovereigns, on the other. Each contributes to respect
for the rule of law. I appreciate the continued attention of Congress to these matters, and
the opportunity to testify about them.
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Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,” 39 Int’l Legal
Materials 1298, 1303-04 (2000); see American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 405-06 (2003).
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